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COMPUTER AS CONFIDANT: DIGITAL INVESTMENT ADVICE 
AND THE FIDUCIARY STANDARD
NICOLE G. IANNARONE1
Automated investment advisers permeate the investment industry.2
Digital investment advisers are the fastest growing segment of financial tech-
nology (FinTech) and are disrupting traditional investment advisory delivery 
models.3 Proponents of digital investment advice, a platform also known as 
“robo-advisers,” claim that they can provide fiduciary level investment ad-
visory services at a fraction of the cost of traditional human investment ad-
visers. Critics disagree. Nevertheless, by 2020, robo-advisers will digitally 
manage $2 trillion in assets, growing over 3,000% from 2015.4 One industry 
observer predicts that in five years, “[r]obo-advisory services will become 
mainstream.”5 Robo-advisers are becoming so ubiquitous that the Chartered 
Financial Analyst (CFA) examination will, beginning in 2019, expand the 
examination areas to include questions on “artificial intelligence, automated 
1. Assistant Clinical Professor and Director, Investor Advocacy Clinic, Georgia State University 
College of Law. Thank you to Benjamin P. Edwards and W. Edward Afield for their feedback on earlier 
drafts of this article.
2. Mary Jo White, Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Opening Remarks at the Fintech Forum, 
(Nov. 14, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/statement/white-opening-remarks-fintech-forum.html 
[https://perma.cc/E4XG-3FU4] (“The last few years have seen rapid growth in the availability and pop-
ularity of automated investment advisory programs. “).
3. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, BLURRED LINES: HOW FINTECH IS SHAPING FINANCIAL 
SERVICES 3 (2016), https://www.pwc.com/il/en/home/assets/pwc_fintech_global_report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/VF9Q-R8A5] (“FinTech is a dynamic segment at the intersection of the financial ser-
vices and technology sectors where technology-focused start-ups and new market entrants innovate the 
products and services currently provided by the traditional financial services industry.”); CHARTERED 
FIN. ANALYST INST., FINTECH SURVEY REPORT 16 (2016), https://www.cfainstitute.org/Sur-
vey/fintech_survey.PDF (“[R]obo-advisers are still considered to be the technology that will have the 
greatest impact on financial services industry both 1 year and 5 years from now.”).
4. ACCENTURE, THE RISE OF ROBO-ADVICE 2 (2015), https://www.accenture.com/_acnme-
dia/PDF-2/Accenture-Wealth-Management-Rise-of-Robo-Advice.pdf [https://perma.cc/EFG3-GHX3]
(projecting robo-advisers at end of 2015 to manage “between $55 billion and $60 billion”); A.T.
KEARNEY, HYPE VS. REALITY: THE COMING WAVES OF “ROBO” ADOPTION 26 (2015),
https://www.atkearney.com/documents/10192/7132014/Hype+vs.+Reality_The+Com-
ing+Waves+of+Robo+Adoption.pdf/9667a470-7ce9-4659-a104-375e4144421d [http://perma.cc/YS77-
CAHK] (predicting $2 trillion under robo-adviser management by 2020); SEC, OS-1114, FINTECH 
FORUM TRANSCRIPT 21 (2016), www.sec.gov/spotlight/fintech/transcript-111416.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/53JC-R6EG] [hereinafter SEC, FINTECH FORUM] (robo-adviser industry “could grow 
to as large as 2.2 trillion dollars in assets under management by the year 2020.”).
5. A.T. KEARNEY, supra note 4, at 10.
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investment services and mining unconventional sources of data.”6 U.S. Se-
curities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulators began examining digi-
tal investment advisers in 2017.7
The computer-led investment advisory service model may be growing 
particularly quickly due to a confluence of social and political factors includ-
ing an increased regulatory focus on the different standards applicable to in-
vestment advice providers, a so-called retirement gap with a lack of 
affordable investment advice, and an increasing comfort with digital plat-
forms.8 This short article begins by describing those factors in Part I before 
discussing, in Part II, the wide-ranging definitions of robo-advisers and cat-
egories of distinction between them. Part III shifts the focus to the regulatory 
framework and standard of care owed by robo-advisers operating under the 
Investment Advisers Act. The essay concludes with a two-pronged recom-
mendation for the regulation of robo-advisers in the near term. First, regula-
tors should deploy existing regulatory tools such as examination, 
enforcement, and disclosure to explore the sufficiency and malleability of 
their current parameters before constructing any new regulatory schemes. 
Second, the disclosure device should be studied to determine whether the 
intended beneficiary of the disclosure, a retail investor, comprehends the in-
formation being disclosed to them and whether changes to the format, deliv-
ery, and/or content of disclosures would better protect consumer investors.
I. INVESTMENT ADVICE GOES ONLINE: THE BIRTH AND GROWTH OF 
ROBO-ADVISERS
The majority of the 140 robo-adviser platforms created since 2008 be-
gan operations in the past three years.9 At the same time, Americans are not
6. Trevor Hunnicutt, CFA Exam to Add Artificial Intelligence, “Big Data” Questions, REUTERS
(May 23, 2017), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-investment-tech-cfa/cfa-exam-to-add-artificial-intel-
ligence-big-data-questions-idUSKBN18J2R4 [https://perma.cc/RGM4-DAZ2].
7. SEC, EXAMINATION PRIORITIES FOR 2017 2 (2017), https://www.sec.gov/about/of-
fices/ocie/national-examination-program-priorities-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/B5JC-TLP4] (describing 
examination of robo-advisers as priority); Mary Jo White, Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Keynote 
Address at the SEC-Rock Center on Corporate Governance Silicon Valley Initiative (Mar. 31, 2016), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/chair-white-silicon-valley-initiative-3-31-16.html 
[https://perma.cc/YT94-EKDS] (“As part of our effort to monitor emerging automated investment mod-
els, staff from our National Exam Program are examining robo-advisors.”).
8. Digital Investment Advice Resource Center Overview, SEC. INDUS. & FIN. MKTS. ASS’N,
http://www.sifma.org/issues/legal,-compliance-and-administration/digitial-investment-advice/overview/
[http://perma.cc/2VMS-F9BB] (listing factors tied to robo-advisers’ rapid rise).
9. BLACKROCK, DIGITAL INVESTMENT ADVICE: ROBO ADVISORS COME OF AGE 5 (2016), 
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/en-at/literature/whitepaper/viewpoint-digital-investment-advice-
september-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/HQT5-PS4F] (“Nearly 140 digital advisory companies have been 
founded since 2008, with over 80 of those founded in the past two years.”).
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ready for retirement and exhibit overall low levels of financial literacy. The 
robo-advice industry’s growth tracks societal changes encouraging invest-
ment in and use of increasingly better technological tools and seizes upon 
opportunities presented by digital native investors who may be financially 
inexperienced and wary of high fees. Moreover, increased governmental fo-
cus on advice standards has fueled robo-advisers’ growth.
A. American Investing Confidence, Competence, and Retirement 
Readiness
America may be in the midst of a retirement “crisis.”10 Americans lack 
a foundation in basic financial and investing concepts and have “relatively 
low levels of financial literacy.”11 Over half of Americans have made no 
attempt to determine their future retirement needs.12 Most American workers 
are now responsible for their own retirement, with a precipitous drop in ac-
cess to defined benefit plans.13 Reviewing recent studies, the SEC’s Office 
of the Investor Advocate reported that most households over the age of 55 
“have no retirement savings in a defined contribution plan or individual re-
tirement account, and nearly 30 percent of households age 55-and-older have 
no retirement savings and no defined benefit (e.g. pension) plan.”14 For those 
who do have retirement savings, the median amount saved is $20,000 and 
most between the ages of 50 and 75 have retirement savings below 
$25,000.15 In addition, the use of professional advisers to assist investors in 
managing their assets is the exception rather than the rule, with less than one 
10. FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH. INV’R EDUC. FOUND., FINANCIAL CAPABILITY IN THE 
UNITED STATES 2016, at 16 (2016), 
http://www.usfinancialcapability.org/downloads/NFCS_2015_Report_Natl_Findings.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A6MQ-EWYS] (“[S]tudies have warned that the U.S. faces a retirement savings cri-
sis.”).
11. Id. at 28.
12. Id. at 15 (“Thirty-nine percent of respondents have tried to figure out how much they need to 
save for retirement, while 56% have not.”).
13. Roberta S. Karmel, The Challenge of Fiduciary Regulation: The Investment Advisers Act After 
Seventy-Five Years, 10 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 405, 419–20 (2016) (describing steep decline in 
access to defined benefit pension plans and increase of Americans participating in defined contribution 
plans); SEC, FINTECH FORUM, supra note 4, at 25 (“[W]e have a generation of people who won’t have 
access to defined benefits quite the same way that past generations have, where maybe Social Security 
Administration has told people not to depend on the full benefit today.”); Barbara Black, Are Retail In-
vestors Better Off Today?, 2 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 303, 305 (2008) (“Today’s reality is that 
investing is no more an optional activity for most American adults than is working. American workers 
are increasingly expected to assume responsibility for their financial security in retirement, and thus have 
no choice but to invest in the markets.”).
14. OFFICE OF THE INV’R ADVOCATE, SEC, PERSPECTIVES ON RETIREMENT READINESS IN THE 
UNITED STATES: A WHITE PAPER 2 (2016), https://www.sec.gov/advocate/staff-papers/white-papers/re-
tirement-readiness-white-paper.pdf [http://perma.cc/NN6G-DDH2].
15. Id. at 4.
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third of Americans receiving investment advice.16 Yet professional advice 
may benefit investors.17
B. Consumers’ Comfort with Computers Increases
FinTech, including robo-advisers, appeals most to younger investors.18
Experts predicted that millennials would be the prototypical robo-advisory 
client because they are digital natives comfortable with online service deliv-
ery.19 While that initial predication was correct,20 later studies showed that 
digital investment advisory services appeal to all generations.21 Robo-ad-
viser Betterment reports “the average age [of an investor customer] is around 
35, which is on the cusp of millennial, but around 30 percent of our business 
comes from people over 50 years old.”22 Investors may prefer the lack of 
direct human-adviser control as well as the flexibility of accessing infor-
16. BLACKROCK, supra note 9, at 3 (“[O]nly 28% of individuals surveyed use a professional finan-
cial advisor”). 
17. Bo Lu, CEO of FutureAdvisor, believes “many more people in the U.S. would benefit from 
advice than receive it today or have ready access to it today.” SEC, FINTECH FORUM, supra note 4, at 24.
18. FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH. INV’R EDUC. FOUND., INVESTORS IN THE UNITED STATES 
2016, at 8 (2016), http://www.usfinancialcapability.org/down-
loads/NFCS_2015_Inv_Survey_Full_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/QM8V-P4B8] (“Usage of ‘robo-advi-
sors’ is higher among younger investors and those who do not otherwise work with a financial advisor.”); 
id. at 20 (“Younger investors are less likely to use professional advisors, more likely to use ‘robo-advi-
sors’”); Survey Finds Affluent Millennials & Gen Xers Will Move More Assets to Advisors over Next 
Decade, INV. WKLY. NEWS, May 27, 2017, at 515 (detailing survey finding that Gen X and Millennials 
expect financial advisers to leverage technology while providing financial advisory services).
19. BLACKROCK, supra note 9, at 7 (“Digital advice can increase the likelihood that people will 
engage on financial advice, particularly because younger generations may be more accustomed to elec-
tronic forms of communication.”).
20. Matt Egan, Robo Advisors: The Next Big Thing in Investing, CNN MONEY (June 18, 2015, 2:44 
PM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/06/18/investing/robo-advisor-millennials-wealthfront/index.html.
[https://perma.cc/A6T8-AR7F] (“Millennials, who often don’t have enough money to qualify for tradi-
tional advisors, are big users for robo advisors.”); ACCENTURE, supra note 4, at 7 (“Robo-advice fills a 
void for millennials . . . .”); PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 3.
21. BD. OF THE INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, UPDATE TO THE REPORT ON THE IOSCO
AUTOMATED ADVICE TOOLS SURVEY 9 (2016), www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD552.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/UJJ6-94EB] [hereinafter IOSCO UPDATE] (“[T]he primary market for automated ad-
vice is millennials (born between 1980 and 2000), but that other age groups such as Generation X (born 
between 1965 and 1980), as well as subsequent generations are making use of these tools.”); Press Re-
lease, Capital One Investing, Retirement Confidence Dips in 2017 (Mar. 13, 2017), https://content.cap-
italoneinvesting.com/mgdcon/core/aboutus/press/20170310_Financial-Freedom-Survey.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/XWR2-VRU7] (“Millennials also most value robo-advice, with 65 percent saying it can 
enhance financial peace of mind, compared to 53 percent of Generation X and 31 percent of Baby Boom-
ers.”).
22. SEC, FINTECH FORUM, supra note 4, at 34.
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mation on their own coupled with the learning opportunities that digital in-
vestment services provide.23 A digital platform offered over a desktop or 
mobile device is not constrained by a human adviser’s office hours, allowing 
investors to access their account information at any time.24 Robo-advisers’ 
separation of investments, account information, and investor education from 
a person, set hours, and an office also affords investors a measure of privacy 
and control not necessarily available in a traditional advisory relationship.25
It is this instant access to information that makes some robo-advisers believe 
that their services appeal to both smaller investors and more sophisticated 
investors with higher account balances.26
C. Legislation and Regulatory Activity Focuses Attention on Invest-
ment Advice
Recent legislative and regulatory activity has focused attention on robo-
advisors.27 Although it is beyond the scope of this essay to fully articulate 
the differences between investment advice providers, in general, only invest-
ment advisers required to register under the 1940 Investment Advisers Act 
(1940 Act) or a state equivalent uniformly owe their clients a fiduciary duty 
while other providers of investment advice, which can include broker-deal-
ers, financial planners, and insurance agents, do not uniformly owe fiduciary 
duties to their clients.28 The disparate standards applicable to professionals 
23. ACCENTURE, supra note 4, at 5 (“There are also elements of the robo-advice experience that 
clients prefer over traditional models. They like the privacy offered by a digital solution and the ability 
to learn, and to chart their own path.”).
24. BLACKROCK, supra note 9, at 4 (benefits of robo-advisors include “the ability to interact with 
the tools 24/7”).
25. Falguni Desai, The Great FinTech Robo Advisor Race, FORBES (July 31, 2016, 11:54 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/falgunidesai/2016/07/31/the-great-fintech-robo-adviser-
race/#57f979a94a6f [http://perma.cc/C2H4-ERW4].
26. SEC, FINTECH FORUM, supra note 4, at 33.
27. BLACKROCK, supra note 9, at 3, 8 (“[R]ecent changes to regulation . . . have resulted in a 
greater focus on digital advice as a potential solution to provide low-cost investment advice with appro-
priately tailored outcomes to individual investors at scale.”).
28. Only one category of individuals providing investment advice are uniformly fiduciaries: indi-
viduals who qualified as investment advisers under the 1940 Investment Advisers Act or a similar state 
regulation. Others who may provide investment advice, including broker-dealers, insurance agents, and 
financial planners, were not, absent some exceptions, required to provide fiduciary-level advice and are 
regulated, if at all, under different standards of care. Scholars have extensively detailed the differences 
between the standards governing investment advisers and broker-dealers, with some recommending har-
monization of those standards to a unitary fiduciary duty for all providers of investment advice to elimi-
nate consumer confusion. See generally Arthur B. Laby, Fiduciary Obligations of Broker-Dealers and 
Investment Advisers, 55 VILL. L. REV. 701 (2010) (describing differences between broker-dealer and in-
vestment adviser regulation and application of fiduciary standard); Steven D. Irwin et al., Wasn’t My 
Broker Always Looking Out for My Best Interests? The Road to Become a Fiduciary, 12 DUQ. BUS. L. J.
41, 61 (2009) (“A consistent fiduciary duty standard would likely help to increase investor trust.”); Bar-
bara Black, How to Improve Retail Investor Protection After the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and 
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nearly indistinguishable to the investing public has led to calls to harmonize 
the treatment of all providers of investment advice.29
Significant attention to investment advice regulation began following 
the 2008 economic crisis. The 2010 Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act directed the SEC to study the differing standards 
of care that broker-dealers and investment advisers owe their clients and to 
identify any regulatory gaps that should be closed to better protect retail con-
sumers.30 While the SEC’s study has been completed and resulted in staff 
recommendations for a uniform fiduciary standard,31 the SEC has not yet 
proposed any new regulation. On April 6, 2016, the Department of Labor 
(DOL) released its final version of a “fiduciary rule” that would require all 
persons providing investment advice to tax qualified retirement accounts to 
adhere to a fiduciary standard.32 Promulgated after significant study, debate, 
and a lengthy notice and comment period, the fiduciary rule would result in 
a major shift in regulation of financial advice.33
Robo-advisers received significant attention during the DOL fiduciary 
rule debate. The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) predicted 
that the fiduciary rule would lead its broker-dealer members to abandon IRA 
accounts under $25,000 due to prohibitively high compliance costs.34 More-
over, while acknowledging that robo-advice may benefit “some classes of 
Consumer Protection Act, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 59 (2010) (describing differences in regulation between 
broker-dealers and investment advisers and arguing for professionalism as opposed to fiduciary standard). 
Cf. Arthur B. Laby, SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 91 
B.U. L. REV. 1051 (2011) (arguing that fiduciary duty now recognized as arising out of the 1940 Act may 
be a faulty premise).
29. See, e.g., Christine Lazaro & Benjamin P. Edwards, The Fragmented Regulation of Investment 
Advice: A Call for Harmonization, 4 MICH. BUS. & ENTREPRENEURIAL L. REV. 47 (2014); see also Ryan
K. Bakhtiari et al., The Time for a Uniform Fiduciary Duty Is Now, 87 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 313 (2013). 
30. Black, supra note 28, at 59–61; James S. Wrona, The Best of Both Worlds: A Fact-Based Anal-
ysis of the Legal Obligations of Investment Advisers and Broker-Dealers and a Framework for Enhanced 
Investor Protection, 68 BUS. LAW. 1, 5–7 (2012).
31. SEC, STUDY ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKER DEALERS, at ii (2011), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/913studyfinal.pdf [https://perma.cc/4MYX-TFRL].
32. Definition of the Term “Fiduciary”; Conflict of Interest Rule–Retirement Investment Advice; 
Best Interest Contract Exemption (Prohibition Transaction Exemption 2016-01); Class Exemption for 
Principal Transactions in Certain Assets Between Investment Advice Fiduciaries and Employee Benefit 
Plans and IRAs (Prohibited Transaction Exemption 2016-02); Prohibited and Transaction Exemptions 
75–1, 77–4, 80–83, 83–1, 84–24 and 86–128, 82 Fed. Reg. 12319 (proposed Mar. 2, 2017) (to be codified 
at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2510), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2017-03-02/pdf/2017-04096.pdf. 
[https://perma.cc/9AB8-DUB7]. By virtue of its oversight of ERISA, the Department of Labor issues 
rules concerning tax advantaged retirement accounts such as individual retirement accounts and 401(k) 
accounts, among others. See Karmel, supra note 13, at 423–424 (describing obligations of fiduciaries 
under ERISA).
33. See, e.g., Karmel, supra note 13, at 424–25 (describing critiques of fiduciary rule).
34. Letter from Marcia E. Asquith, Senior Vice President, Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth., to the U.S. 
Dep’t of Labor, RE: Proposed Conflict of Interest Rule and Related Proposals, RIN-1210-AB32, at 5–6
(July 17, 2015), http://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/FINRACommentLetter_DOL_07-17-15.pdf 
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knowledgeable investors,” FINRA commented that for many others, “robo-
advice is a poor substitute for a financial adviser who understands the cus-
tomer’s needs and guides the customer through market turbulence or life 
events.”35 On the other hand, DOL leadership predicted that robo-advisers 
could make it possible for exponentially more investors to receive fiduciary 
level investment advice at lower costs.36 Robo-advisory firms claimed that 
they had already been providing advice meeting a fiduciary standard as reg-
istered investment advisers under the 1940 Act.37 Scholars likewise argued 
that the elimination of a commission-based fee structure “would likely ac-
celerate the growth of so-called robo-advisers.”38
President Trump executed a Presidential Memorandum on February 3, 
2017 directing the DOL “to examine the Fiduciary Duty Rule to determine 
whether it may adversely affect the ability of Americans to gain access to 
retirement information and financial advice.”39 As a result, full implementa-
tion has been delayed repeatedly and the fiduciary rule may ultimately be 
revised or eliminated.40 Nevertheless, the DOL’s efforts to mandate that all 
[http://perma.cc/B66X-F9AA]; see also Paul R. Walsh & David W. Johns, Can the Retail Investor Sur-
vive the Fiduciary Standard?, 87 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 437, 449 (2013) (“[T]he imposition of a fiduciary 
duty onto the broker or salesman will create a barrier to the availability of investment advice to the small 
investor.”).
35. Asquith, supra note 34, at 6.
36. Restricting Access to Financial Advice: Evaluating the Costs and Consequences for Working
Families and Retirees: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health, Emp’t, Labor, & Pensions of the H. 
Comm. on Educ. & the Workforce, 114th Cong. 102 (2015) (testimony of Hon. Thomas E. Perez, Secre-
tary, U.S. Dep’t. of Labor) (describing how robo-adviser Wealthfront may be able to provide fiduciary 
level service at lower cost through technology).
37. See Letter from Jon Stein & Eli Broveman, Founders, Betterment, to U.S. Dep’t. of Labor, Re: 
Conflict of Interest Rule, RIN 1210-AB32 (Sept. 24, 2015), https://www.dol.gov/sites/de-
fault/files/ebsa/laws-and-regulations/rules-and-regulations/public-comments/1210-AB32-2/03108.pdf. 
[https://perma.cc/2ZSS-7W6L] (“[T]he rapidly growing category of automated investment advice is 
emerging as a clear rebuttal to those who worry that small accounts will be left unserved. Modern tech-
nology allows for fiduciary advice to be delivered at unprecedented scale, with the expected quantum 
leap in affordability. We believe that these services, offering lower, transparent prices, fiduciary advice, 
and superior experiences, will prevail in the market against heavily conflicted, legacy business models.”).
38. Benjamin P. Edwards, Conflicts and Capital Allocation, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 181, 221 (2017); see 
also Ralph Derbyshire & Jay Haines, Department of Labor Rule Shakes Up Retirement Industry, 61 BOS.
BAR J. 18, 19 (2017) (arguing that fiduciary rule should result in increase in accounts managed by robo-
advisers).
39. Fiduciary Duty Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. 9675 (Exec. Office of the President Feb. 3, 2017), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/02/03/presidential-memorandum-fiduciary-duty-rule
[https://perma.cc/68Z7-H2GH].
40. See, e.g., Carmen Germaine, Further Delay Tees Up Fiduciary Rule for Major Changes,
LAW360 (Aug. 10, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/953235/further-delay-tees-up-fiduciary-
rule-for-major-changes [http://perma.cc/8GCC-3F99] (describing Department of Labor plan to delay im-
plementation of not-yet-in-place provisions of fiduciary rule until July 2019).
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providers of investment advice meet a fiduciary standard focused moved the 
topic from the regulatory realm into popular culture.41
D. The Promise of Robo-Advisers
Robo-advisers’ promise is tied to their potential to address these chal-
lenges while capitalizing on opportunities technological growth creates. 
Robo-advisory firms differ from traditional human investment advisers be-
cause they generally do not have as high account minimums for advice and 
charge fees that are substantially less than human investment advisers.42 The 
enthusiasm for robo-advisers comes from a belief that they are well-
equipped to serve a previously underserved population of investors that in-
cludes, but is not limited to millennials—investors with accounts deemed too 
small for traditional investment advisers.43 Investment advisers typically 
charge at least 1% of assets under management as fee for their services.44
Robo-advisers, on the other hand, charge much less, including fees starting 
as low as 15 basis points of assets under management.45 In addition to their 
purported ability to provide broader access to financial advice at a lower cost, 
41. As one example, comedian John Oliver made the DOL’s fiduciary rule the focus of his popular 
late night show, “Last Week Tonight,” describing a rule that had, until then, “been considered too com-
plicated or boring for the average person to understand.” Mark Schoeff, John Oliver’s Criticism Helps 
Fiduciary Duty Go Prime Time, INVESTMENTNEWS, (Jun. 19, 2016), http://www.investment-
news.com/article/20160619/FREE/160619914/john-olivers-criticism-helps-fiduciary-duty-go-prime-
time [https://perma.cc/X7ZH-YUDN]. The segment has over 6.5 million views on YouTube since it was 
posted on June 12, 2016. See LastWeekTonight, Retirement Plans: Last Week Tonight with John Oliver 
(HBO), YOUTUBE (June 12, 2016), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gvZSpET11ZY. 
42. White, supra note 7; Investor Bulletin: Robo-Advisers, SEC (Feb. 23, 2017), 
https://www.sec.gov/oiea/investor-alerts-bulletins/ib_robo-advisers.html [https://perma.cc/QRJ2-
XKYH] (“Robo-advisers often seek to offer investment advice for lower costs and fees than traditional 
advisory programs, and in some cases require lower account minimums than traditional investment ad-
visers.”).
43. ACCENTURE, supra note 4, at 2 (“[F]ull-service advisors are looking at robo-advice as a way to 
serve smaller accounts and increase advisor productivity.”); id. at 7 (“Part of the excitement surrounding 
robo-advice services is their appeal to non-traditional clients, especially younger clients with fewer assets 
to manage.”); BLACKROCK, supra note 9, at 6 (“For a large segment of the investing public, digital advi-
sory services have the potential to provide affordable and accessible services.”).
44. Desai, supra note 25.
45. Id. (“Fees are competitive and range between 15 to 35 basis points of AUM.”); see also Ed-
wards, supra note 38, at 221 (describing fee structure of one robo-adviser that does not charge any fees 
for accounts under $10,000 and 0.25% of assets under management for accounts over $10,000).
A recent study of robo-advisory platforms found that they “present[] investors with an interesting value 
proposition—with a price reduction of as much as 70 percent for some services.” ACCENTURE, supra note
4, at 2; see also BD. OF THE INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’N, REPORT ON THE IOSCO SOCIAL MEDIA AND 
AUTOMATION OF ADVICE TOOLS SURVEYS 4 (2014), http://www.iosco.org/library/pub-
docs/pdf/IOSCOPD445.pdf [http://perma.cc/FE7P-TUUF] [hereinafter IOSCO SOCIAL MEDIA REPORT]
(“From an intermediary’s perspective, providing customers advice through an automated means presents 
an opportunity to formulate and deliver advice in a cost effective way.”); CHARTERED FIN. ANALYST 
INST., supra note 3, at 11 (“[C]ost, access to advice, and product choice are all viewed as more likely to 
have a positive impact on customers.”).
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robo-advisers are heralded for another aspect of the fiduciary rule—the pur-
ported ability to provide conflict-free advice at a fiduciary level.46 Robo-ad-
visers’ promises about the services they can provide are also met with 
significant questions, including questions about their limitations and the hu-
mans who may potentially introduce flaws into them.47
II. ROBO-ADVISERS DEFINED
Establishing a single definition of “robo-adviser” presents a problem: 
there is no universal platform or design.48 “Robo-adviser” as colloquially 
used encompasses a wide spectrum of services and business models, but all 
provide investment advice in a digital format using proprietary algorithms.49
Beyond this common trait, there is substantial variation between robo-advice 
platforms, with differences in: (1) end user of the digital advice; (2) range of 
investment advice and options provided; and (3) level of human investment 
adviser interaction.50
A. End Users of Robo-Advisor Advice
Robo-advice platforms are both industry- and investor-facing, with us-
ers who include financial advisers, investors working without financial ad-
visers, and investors working with financial advisers.51 The financial 
46. BLACKROCK, supra note 9, at 12 (“Digital advisory services have the potential to significantly 
mitigate behavioral finance biases and provide customized investment tools to individual investors at a 
relatively low cost.”).
47. Thus, while Professors Tom Baker and Benedict G.C. Dellaert argue that a well-designed robo-
adviser has the capacity to operate at a greater level than humans, because the humans who design robo-
advisers are flawed, robo-advisers may exhibit those flaws. Tom Baker & Benedict G.C. Dellaert, Regu-
lating Robo Advice Across the Financial Services Industry, 103 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (man-
uscript at 18–19), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2932189 [http://perma.cc/QS6N-SKBK].
48. BLACKROCK, supra note 9, at 1 (“Digital advice is not all the same[.]”).
49. Investor Bulletin: Robo-Advisers, supra note 42 (“The term ‘robo-adviser’ generally refers to 
an automated digital investment advisory program.”); Digital Investment Advice Resource Center Over-
view, supra note 8 (describing robo-advisers as “digital investment advisers”); ACCENTURE, supra note 
4, at 2 (robo-advice is “the use of automated and digital techniques to build and manage portfolios of 
exchange-traded funds (ETFs) and other instruments for investors”); Press Release, SEC, SEC Staff Is-
sues Guidance Update and Investor Bulletin on Robo-Advisers (Feb. 23, 2017), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2017-52.html [https://perma.cc/MDU4-P9X2] (robo-advisers are 
“registered investment advisers that use computer algorithms to provide investment advisory services 
online with often limited human interaction”).
50. Investor Bulletin: Robo-Advisers, supra note 42; BLACKROCK, supra note 9, at 4 (differences 
include “(i) customization, (ii) tax management, (iii) human intervention/oversight, and (iv) type of entity 
providing digital advice”).
51. FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., REPORT ON DIGITAL INVESTMENT ADVICE 2 (2016), 
https://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/digital-investment-advice-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/GG8D-
VK58] (“[I]nvestment advice tools can be broken down into two groups: tools that financial professionals 
use, referred to here as ‘financial professional facing’ tools, and tools that clients use, referred to here as 
‘client-facing’ tools.”).
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industry has used digital tools for many years, perhaps even without inves-
tors’ knowledge. For example, the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions (IOSCO) found that firms use digital tools to gather the infor-
mation upon which human advisers make investment recommendations.52
Bo Lu, CEO of robo-adviser FutureAdvisor believes that robo-adviser tech-
nology assists human investment advisers in serving their clients because 
“they can have the digital platform take the workload off them and focus on 
things where they add the unique value, such as relationship-building, trust-
building, and coaching with their clients.”53 Indeed, some even argue that a 
human investment adviser must use the technology available in digital advi-
sory products to fully understand the client and provide the best services.54
Other platforms using robo-advice are designed with an investor end-
user in mind. Though serving the same end-user, these investor-facing robo-
advisers comprise myriad tools with varying functionality.55 On one end of 
the spectrum is an advisory firm that integrates robo-advice capabilities with 
traditional, human investment advisers. The most simplistic hybrid platforms 
obtain information from an investor to develop the customer’s profile so that 
a human investment adviser can provide some level of traditional, face-to-
face advice to an investor.56 Others offer clients full access to digital invest-
ment advisory tools along with human support. Robo-advisory services part-
nered with a human investment adviser are cited as an option for ensuring 
that investor clients with less assets than traditionally managed by an invest-
ment adviser can obtain the full- service advice that they may need for their 
particular circumstances.57
On the other end of the spectrum are fully digital robo-advisers that use
an algorithm to review information input by the customer to recommend ser-
vices from “asset allocation, to tax management, to product selection and 
trade execution.”58 All provided tools are on a digital platform and many of 
52. IOSCO SOCIAL MEDIA REPORT, supra note 45, at 13.
53. SEC, FINTECH FORUM, supra note 4, at 38; see also BLACKROCK, supra note 9, at 6 (“[T]hese 
services can be advantageous for financial institutions, including traditional advisors, by automating rou-
tine aspects of the client servicing process and providing advisors with greater channels of communica-
tions with clients.”).
54. Id. at 55 (Personal Capital’s Mark Goines describing how digital technology improves invest-
ment advisers’ advice to their clients).
55. FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., supra note 51, at 3.
56. Id.
57. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 3, at 13 (“Robo-advisors provide a viable solution for 
this segment and, if positioned correctly as part of a full service offering, can serve as a segue to full 
service advice for clients with specific needs or higher touch.”); ACCENTURE, supra note 4, at 11 
(“[R]obo-advice services can be a bet on the future—a way to get customers and financial advisors accli-
mated to working with machines that can enhance and extend human performance.”).
58. BLACKROCK, supra note 9, at 1.
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the provided services, such as rebalancing of accounts to meet a pre-deter-
mined asset allocation, are accomplished automatically.59 Robo-adviser ser-
vice models may include one, all, or several different pieces of the available 
customer-facing digital investment tools.60
B. Range of Advice Provided and Investment Choices Available
Another definitional challenge relates to the range of advice and invest-
ment choices robo-advisers provide.61 The most simplistic digital investment 
tools include financial planning targets for different ages and risk profiles 
that an investor may find on an investment adviser or broker dealer’s web-
site.62 Some digital advice tools go a step further and “provide[] a list of 
securities, investment funds or model portfolios that may be considered low, 
medium, or high risk for investors to choose from based on the customer’s 
risk appetite but without detailed information about the individual cus-
tomer.”63
The platforms that better fit the name robo-adviser provide tailored fi-
nancial advice by applying algorithms that analyze and make decisions based 
on customer-provided information relating to financial circumstances and 
goals. A recent study summarizes the spectrum of advice such providers 
give: “Algorithms can range from a simple or pre-packaged algorithm that 
builds a single portfolio to a complex multi-strategy algorithm that reviews 
thousands of instruments and scenarios in order to construct an aggregate 
portfolio based on an individual’s current holdings, investment horizon, and 
risk tolerance.”64 Nevertheless, even the most sophisticated robo-advisers 
that provide fully personalized advice based on specific investor inputs typ-
ically offer their investors a narrower range of investment choices than tra-
ditional investment advisers, often limiting choices to low-cost exchange-
traded funds (ETFs) and mutual funds.65
59. Desai, supra note 25 (“[Robo-advisers’] services include automated portfolio planning, auto-
matic asset allocation, online risk assessments, account rebalancing and other digital tools.”).
60. FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., supra note 51, at 2.
61. BLACKROCK, supra note 9, at 3 (“Digital advisors have a number of different investment phi-
losophies, methods, and strategies. The algorithms fueling digital advice very in terms of sophistica-
tion.”).
62. IOSCO SOCIAL MEDIA REPORT, supra note 45, at 7.
63. Id. at 7–8.
64. BLACKROCK, supra note 9, at 3. 
65. ACCENTURE, supra note 4, at 2; see also IOSCO UPDATE, supra note 21, at 27 (investment 
choices include “collective investment schemes, mutual funds, ETFs and equity classes are the most com-
mon”); IOSCO SOCIAL MEDIA REPORT, supra note 45.
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C. Levels of Human Involvement
Robo-advisers may not provide a human touch that some believe essen-
tial to the investor adviser/client relationship: the ability to provide in-person 
support, comfort, and advice to investors in times of market volatility.66 The 
traditional investment adviser’s “personal touch” is why some predict that 
robo-advisers will never entirely replace the traditional, human investment 
adviser.67 Financial industry-backed studies support this prediction, finding 
that 74 percent of investors prefer receiving their investment advice from a 
human in a volatile market.68
This does not mean, however, that investors employing robo-advisers 
do not interact with humans. The term “robo-adviser” may thus be a misno-
mer as it may lead investors to believe that financial advice provided through 
such a service comes without any human interaction.69 Mark Goines, vice 
chair of digital wealth management firm Personal Capital, says that “we 
don’t like the term ‘robo’” because “even robo-advisors aren’t really robo-
advisors.”70 A human touch is required for all robo-advisers,71 though that 
touch differs from that of a traditional human investment adviser by design 
so that the cost of the ultimate advice may be lower.72 Each robo-adviser 
makes its own decision about the total level of human involvement, though 
there are some common themes.73 Humans must be involved in the design 
66. SEC Investor Advocate Rick Fleming described the role of the investment adviser in working 
with clients during rocky markets: “[T]here’s a lot of benefit that comes from the human touch and having 
somebody there that’s going to sort of calm the waters and, when the markets are going down, making 
sure that investors aren’t making really bad decisions at the worst possible time. And so, I think it, again, 
is one of those things that sort of remains to be seen, is how well technology can sort of replicate that and 
put those protections into place.” SEC, FINTECH FORUM, supra note 4, at 244. Asquith, supra note 34
(“[F]or many customers robo-advice is a poor substitute for a financial adviser who understand the cus-
tomer’s needs and guides the customer through market turbulence or life events.”).
67. ACCENTURE, supra note 4, at 5; SEC, FINTECH FORUM, supra note 4, at 243 (Attorney John 
Walsh describing challenges faced by robo-advisers: “We’re used to face to face human interaction, and 
we have confidence in our ability to deal with other people, and that’s why I think, even though Fintech 
is booming and growing, personal advice has a big future ahead of it . . . .”).
68. Press Release, Capital One Investing, supra note 21, at 2 (“[W]hen markets are volatile, most 
(74 percent) investors would prefer engaging a financial advisor.”).
69. Humans play a significant role in all aspects of FinTech, and scholars predict that will continue 
even as financial technology continues to grow and change. See, e.g., Tom C.W. Lin, The New Financial
Industry, 65 ALA. L. REV. 567, 580 (2014) [hereinafter Lin, Industry] (describing myriad and key roles 
of humans in financial technological changes).
70. SEC, FINTECH FORUM, supra note 4, at 27.
71. BLACKROCK, supra note 9, at 4 (“[D]igital advisors have a fundamental obligation to oversee 
their systems and mitigate risks associated with digital processes.”).
72. Investor Bulletin: Robo-Advisers, supra note 42.
73. Only one regulatory scheme, that in place in Canada, currently requires that humans either 
gather initial customer information or proactively contact an investor if the investor’s responses to an 
online questionnaire appears incomplete or provides inconsistent information. See IOSCO UPDATE, supra
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of robo-advice platforms and the proprietary algorithms that deliver advice 
to the investor.74 Other humans ensure that robo-advisers comply with rele-
vant rules and standards, both within the advisory firm and outside the firm 
at the regulatory level.75 Finally, some robo-adviser platforms even permit 
their investor customers to work with a live investment adviser as part of 
their service model.76 The availability of such services may be dependent 
upon the provider, the amount of assets under management, or the package 
elected by the investor.77 When human interaction is part of a robo-adviser’s 
offerings, it does not necessarily mean an in-person discussion with a dedi-
cated investment adviser but may instead be a phone call or electronic access 
to a member of an advisory team.78 In addition to variation across the method 
of contacting a human investment adviser, robo-adviser platforms vary in the 
frequency with which an investor can reach out to a human adviser.79
D. Gathering Information and Making Investment Recommendations
Robo-advisers operate through the information they receive from the 
end user, which is, in our case, the investor customer.80 In this way, robo-
advisers differ very little from traditional investment advisers in that both are 
required to begin by collecting information from their customer in order to 
provide investment advice tailored to the individual investor.81 Human in-
vestment advisers typically obtain information to know their customer and 
note 21, at 6 (describing Canada’s phone and no-phone rules and requirement for no-phone advisers that 
customers be contacted if their responses to an initial questionnaire raise potential concerns).
74. For example, robo-adviser firm Personal Capital’s Mark Goines notes that robo-adviser “tasks 
are automated by humans who figure out what algorithms are, assign strategies, interpret data from peo-
ple.” SEC, FINTECH FORUM, supra note 4, at 27–28.
75. See BLACKROCK, supra note 9, at 10 (“We emphasize the need for investment professionals to 
be closely involved in the design and oversight of the financial advice tool to ensure that the algorithm 
delivers the expected outcome.”).
76. Investor Bulletin: Robo-Advisers, supra note 42. One industry study indicated that investors 
appear to value digital advisers coupled with traditional, human investment advisers over digital advice 
provided directly to investors with little human interaction. See Press Release, Capital One Investing,
supra note 21, at 2.
77. Investor Bulletin: Robo-Advisers, supra note 42. (“[A] robo-adviser may offer access to a per-
son only for accounts that meet a certain minimum account size.”).
78. Id. (“If a robo-adviser does make an investment professional available to you, the format and 
amount of the interaction also may vary.”); id. (“[A] person may be available by email but not by phone.”).
79. Id. (“[A] person may be available . . . only for a limited number of in-person meetings.”).
80. Digital Investment Advice Resource Center Overview, supra note 8 (“[Robo-advisers] offer 
discretionary investment advice using algorithms and information provided by the customer.”).
81. For example, securities intermediaries using digital methods for obtaining sufficient infor-
mation upon which to base a recommendation report (1) that “their tools cover the mandated regulatory 
requirements;” (2) “their tools will not permit recommendations to be made unless all necessary infor-
mation is obtained;” and (3) “they rely on firm account opening policies irrespective of whether the ac-
count is opened on-line or in person.” IOSCO SOCIAL MEDIA REPORT, supra note 45, at 14.
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provide suitable advice from a questionnaire.82 Robo-advisers obtain the 
same categories of information from their customers prior to providing in-
vestment advice, also using a form of questionnaire.83 In both cases, the in-
formation comes from the investor, and, in the case when an investment 
adviser gives an investor a paper questionnaire to fill out, both the human-
and robo- adviser clients provide the initial information on their own. Both 
human-based and robo-adviser questionnaires have been criticized for pur-
ported failures to obtain full information from which to provide suitable ad-
vice to the customer.84 In addition, regulators warn consumers considering 
robo-advisers that it may be up to them to update their profile and financial 
circumstances.85
Robo-advice employs computer algorithms to recommend portfolio 
choices based upon the investor’s response to the initial questions posed con-
cerning their background, risk tolerance, and goals.86 While robo-adviser 
proponents argue that computer generated advice lacks the conflicts of inter-
est or behavioral biases of human advisers, others note that algorithms pre-
sent the greatest risk associated with robo-advisers.87 Cautions concerning 
the use of robo-advisers focus on the potentially limited information upon 
82. Michael Tertilt & Peter Scholz, To Advise, or Not to Advise — How Robo-Advisors Evaluate 
the Risk Preferences of Private Investors 1 (Jun. 12, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/ab-
stract=2913178 [https://perma.cc/AV7D-2RFJ] (“Financial advisors typically complete a questionnaire 
to evaluate the client’s risk tolerance.”).
83. See, e.g., Investor Bulletin: Robo-Advisers, supra note 42 (robo-adviser information collection 
via online questionnaire); Tertilt & Scholz, supra note 82, at 6–11 (describing robo-adviser information 
collection).
84. Tertilt & Scholz, supra note 82, at 3 (“[Human] questionnaires commonly used by financial 
planners do not adhere to psychometric standards; they are generally too brief (a reliability problem) and 
contain too many ‘bad’ questions (a validity problem).”). 
85. Investor Bulletin: Robo-Advisers, supra note 42 (“[T]he burden to update this information will 
fall on you.”).
86. Algorithms are not new. Financial intermediaries began using them decades ago to replace roles 
formerly processed by humans. See, e.g., Arthur B. Laby, Reforming the Regulation of Broker-Dealers 
and Investment Advisers, 65 BUS. LAW. 395, 423 (2009) (describing introduction of ECNs and use of 
algorithms in the 1990s to automate trade executions and replace human judgment).
87. CHARTERED FIN. ANALYST INST., supra note 3, at 14 (“46% of respondents note that flaws in 
automated financial advice algorithms could be the biggest risk introduced from automated financial ad-
vice tools, followed by mis-selling (30%) and privacy and data protection concerns (12%).”); see also 
Tom C.W. Lin, Compliance, Technology, and Modern Finance, 11 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 159, 
180 (2016) [hereinafter Lin, Compliance] (“Uncertainty and risk in finance can never be perfectly mod-
eled, reduced, or eliminated. Despite all the advances in new financial technology and artificial intelli-
gence, there exists no machine so smart that it flawlessly forecasts financial futures and economic risks 
in a world filled with flawed, whimsical, and random human actors.”).
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which algorithm relies.88 One recent study focusing on a subset of interna-
tional robo-advisers found that, on average, robo-advisers ask few questions 
and only use responses from a small proportion of those questions to gener-
ate their advice.89 Industry experts recommend robust due diligence into and 
supervision of algorithms.90 In the same way that a traditional investment 
adviser must know her customer and obtain a wide range of information in 
order to provide suitable advice, the means through which robo-advisers pro-
vide their advice—proprietary algorithms—require robust inputs and are 
only as good as the information upon which they base their calculations and 
recommendations.91
Although the robo-adviser designation can describe multiple models, 
end users, and degrees of human involvement, this essay will focus on robo-
advisory platforms with the investor client as the anticipated end user of a 
digital platform that predominately delivers investment advice via proprie-
tary algorithms, including models where the client has access to a human 
investment adviser for additional support.
III. REGULATION OF ROBO-ADVISERS UNDER CURRENT SCHEME AND 
IN THE FUTURE
Robo-advisers face a dual challenge and opportunity: can they provide 
investment advisory services meeting a fiduciary standard under the 1940 
Act?92 The 1940 Act was the final major financial legislation arising out of 
88. Investor Bulletin: Robo-Advisers, supra note 42; Horacio A. Valeiras, Expert’s Corner: Port-
folio Construction Highly Dependent on the Initial Conditions, 23 PIABA B.J. 75, 75–76 (2016) (“How-
ever, as with so many so-called investment panaceas, many of the robo-adviser models can lead to flawed 
portfolio construction decisions caused by poorly analyzed assumptions and historical data.”).
89. Tertilt & Scholz, supra note 82, at 19 (“In our sample, the robo-advisors pose around ten ques-
tions, but only about ca. 60% of questions actually have an impact on the risk categorization . . . The 
recommended portfolios derived from robo-advice seem to be rather conservative.”).
90. BLACKROCK, supra note 9, at 10 (“A number of key questions to be asked when conducting 
due diligence on the algorithm include: (i) whether the algorithm factors in transaction costs or termina-
tion fees, if any; (ii) whether the algorithm factors in tax implications and, if so, does it have the cost basis 
of each asset; and (iii) whether the algorithm factors in the level of risk that is appropriate for the con-
sumer, especially if the consumer has limited financial knowledge and experience.”).
91. BLACKROCK, supra note 9, at 9 (“Digital advisors, like traditional advisors, are dependent on 
client-provided information to gauge suitability, which is typically obtained through questionnaires. The 
information gathered from these questionnaires should be used to make appropriate recommendations to 
clients.”); SEC, FINTECH FORUM, supra note 4, at 65 (“I think it’s malpractice to not understand a client 
and make a recommendation to them, and algorithms with minimal input run the risk of not fully under-
standing the client.”).
92. White, supra note 7 (“So, in this area, the key questions are focused on whether and how a firm 
meets its Advisers Act obligations, as well as its fiduciary duties, when it provides only or primarily 
automated advice.”).
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the Great Depression and its focus was on a new breed of professionals: in-
vestment advisers who received compensation from clients to recommend 
investment strategies.93 At that time, little was known about the investment 
adviser industry and the 1940 Act was perceived as an opportunity to learn 
about the industry and collect the names of all practicing in the new arena.94
Though it is well known today that investment advisers subject to the 1940 
Act owe their clients a fiduciary duty, the 1940 Act was promulgated without 
the term fiduciary within it. It was not until twenty years later that duties 
owed by investment advisers to their clients were first addressed by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Capital Gains Research Bureau v. SEC, after which full
disclosure became a hallmark of the fiduciary standard owed from invest-
ment advisers to their clients.95 In subsequent cases, courts continued to 
shape the contours of the duties owed to investor advisers’ clients.96 Since 
then, the fiduciary duty owed under the 1940 Act has been defined as requir-
ing disclosure, avoiding conflicts of interest, and acting in the customer’s 
best interest.97
Although lawyers representing both human and robo-advisers have 
weighed in on whether robo-advisers can meet the requirements of the 1940 
Act, there is little in legal scholarship addressing whether robo-advisers can 
While it is possible that some robo-advisers are operating as broker-dealers, most direct to customer plat-
forms appear to be operating as investment advisers. Accordingly, the remainder of this essay will discuss 
the investment adviser regulatory framework rather than the duties owed by broker-dealers.
93. Karmel, supra note 13, at 406 (“As the last of the New Deal securities laws that date between 
1933 and 1940, the Advisers Act was probably the least considered and the least important. It was a weak 
statute, which accomplished little more than creating a registration list of investment advisers.”).
94. Note, Investment Advisers and Disclosure of an Intent to Trade, 71 YALE L.J. 1342, 1342 
(1962) (“[R]elatively little was known about the practices of investment advisers; in fact, the act was in 
large part designed to acquire information about the industry.”); see also Laby, supra note 86, at 403 
(“[L]ittle was known about the number of investment advisers operating at the time or the amount of 
assets they managed.”); id. (1940 Act “little more than a ‘compulsory census’”). 
95. The Supreme Court, 1963 Term—Dealing by Advisers in Recommended Securities, 78 HARV.
L. REV. 292, 294 (1964) (“By interpreting the act to require full disclosure in any situation in which there 
is a possibility of bias, the client himself may evaluate the disinterestedness of the advice.”).
96. Karmel, supra note 13, at 410–411 (describing development of fiduciary duty for investment 
advisers through judicial decisions).
97. Irwin et al., supra note 28, at 59.
2018] COMPUTER AS CONFIDANT 157
be fiduciaries.98 Nevertheless, robo-advisers avail themselves to that frame-
work, assuming its applicability and their ability to live up to it.99 Federal 
regulators believe robo-advisers are subject to the 1940 Act just as human 
advisers are.100 The SEC thus holds robo-advisers to the fiduciary stand-
ard.101 SIFMA, a group representing the securities industry, appears to agree, 
stating that it is possible for robo-advisers to meet the fiduciary standard.102
Only Massachusetts regulators so far present a contrary opinion, writing in a 
policy statement that they do not believe that one subset of robo-advisers, 
98. Representing the traditional advisory community, lawyer Melanie Fein argues that robo-advis-
ers cannot meet the 1940 Act’s standards. See Melanie L. Fein, Robo-Advisors: A Closer Look 1 (Nov. 
14, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2658701 [http://perma.cc/V3ZR-44LQ] 
[hereinafter Fein, Closer Look] (Robo-advisors “are not designed for retirement accounts subject to 
ERISA and should be approached with caution by retail and retirement investors looking for personal 
investment advice.”); Melanie L. Fein, FINRA’s Report on Robo-Advisors: Fiduciary Implications 8 
(Apr. 1, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2768295 [https://perma.cc/Q8WY-
HQQC] [hereinafter Fein, Fiduciary Implications] (questioning whether robo-advisers can meet fiduciary 
standard). On the other hand, lawyers at a firm that represents robo-advisers argue that robo-advisers do 
meet the fiduciary standard. See JENNIFER L. KLASS & ERIC PERELMAN, MORGAN LEWIS, THE 
EVOLUTION OF ADVICE: DIGITAL INVESTMENT ADVISERS AS FIDUCIARIES 17 (2016), https://www.mor-
ganlewis.com/-/media/files/publication/report/im-the-evolution-of-advice-digital-investment-advisers-
as-fiduciaries-october-2016.ashx?la=en&hash=7A28D9586FD8ACADC9731733BFE4281F4E6FEB49 
[https://perma.cc/EW5K-Q9VQ] (“[D]igital advisers are capable of fulfilling fiduciary standards that are 
consistent with the scope and nature of the advisory services that they provide to clients.”). With a view 
towards the greater financial services industry, two scholars have proposed some guiding principles from 
which a robo regulatory scheme can be developed. See Baker & Dellaert, supra note 47 (“[W]e propose 
a regulatory trajectory, rather than a regulatory agenda, that starts by building the necessary human capital 
and only then will move to setting an agenda.”).
99. See IOSCO UPDATE, supra note 21, at 4 (finding in study of international securities regulators 
that majority of regulatory frameworks “are technology neutral and do not differentiate between advice 
or portfolio management delivered by a human and that delivered by a software package, possibly with a 
human interface overlay”); id. at 10 (reporting FINRA/SEC response to survey that concerns related to 
robo-advisers “also apply in the context of more traditional advisors and are unique only to the extent that 
robo advisors place greater emphasis on technology”).
100. Earlier this year, the SEC stated that digital investment advice under the Investment Advisers 
Act is no different than human-directed financial advice: “Robo-advisers, as registered investment advis-
ers, are subject to the substantive and fiduciary obligations of the Advisers Act.” SEC, supra note 49.
Similarly, IOSCO’s 2014 international study on digital investment tools reported that “[a]ll but one reg-
ulator responding to the survey stated that the rules governing advice/recommendations apply irrespective 
of whether the advice/recommendations were made by automated tools or otherwise.” IOSCO SOCIAL 
MEDIA REPORT, supra note 45, at 23. Further, IOSCO found that regulators’ guidance to firms “on areas 
such as disclosure, the provision of advice, supervision, AML, advertising and assessment is technology 
neutral . . . [and] applies irrespective of whether the advice is given by telephone, email, internet, face-
to-face or by a combination of these or other ways.” Id. at 22; see also White, supra note 7 (“Providing 
financial advisory services electronically is different than the traditional adviser model, but in many re-
spects our [the SEC’s] assessment of robo-advisors is no different than for a human-based investment 
adviser.”).
101. DIV. OF INV. MGMT., SEC, IM GUIDANCE UPDATE: ROBO-ADVISORS 2 (2017) [hereinafter 
SEC, IM GUIDANCE UPDATE] (“Robo-advisers, like all registered investment advisers, are subject to the 
substantive and fiduciary obligations of the Advisers’ Act.”).
102. Digital Investment Advice Resource Center Overview, supra note 8 (“Digital investment advis-
ers can fulfill their fiduciary duties under the law so long as they act in good faith, disclose the material 
facts, and use reasonable care not to mislead clients.”). 
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those that are fully automated, can meet a fiduciary duty.103 The consensus 
appears to be that since robo-advisers are availing themselves to the 1940 
Act, it is up to robo advice providers to ensure, and prove, that they can com-
ply with it.104
If the robo-adviser industry is voluntarily availing itself to the 1940 Act, 
regulators’ next step should be to test whether robo-advisers are meeting the 
1940 Act’s requirements. Such an inquiry should use the current regulatory 
toolkit of disclosure, investigation, and enforcement.105 The SEC appears to 
be pursuing this approach. For example, a February 2017 staff guidance up-
date concerning robo-advisers identified three areas that robo-advisers 
should ensure they are meeting to be in compliance with the 1940 Act: (1) 
adequate and effective disclosure; (2) collection of information to deliver 
suitable advice; and (3) effective compliance systems.106 Following up 
through investigation and pursuing enforcement for additional information 
will provide regulators with information that can guide their next steps, in-
cluding whether the current regulatory regime is sufficient or if new regula-
tions are needed. Indeed, due to President Trump’s moratorium on new 
regulation unless two other regulations are discarded, such an approach may 
be preferable to creating new regulation specifically to address robo-advis-
ers.107 While it seems counterintuitive, refraining from regulation until more 
103. See MASS. SEC. DIV., POLICY STATEMENT: ROBO-ADVISERS AND STATE INVESTMENT 
ADVISER REGISTRATION 1 (2016) (“[I]t is the position of the Division that fully automated robo-advisers, 
as currently structured, may be inherently unable to carry out the fiduciary obligations of a state-registered 
investment adviser.”); id. at 3 (defining fully automated robo-adviser as including following criteria: “(1) 
do not meet with or conduct significant (or any) due diligence on a client, (2) provide investment advice 
that is minimally personalized, (3) may fail to meet the high standard of care that is imposed on the 
appropriateness of investment advisers’ investment decision-making, and (4) specifically decline the ob-
ligation to act in a client’s best interests”); id. at 4 (Massachusetts’ Securities Division does nevertheless 
believe that “robo-advisers and traditional advisers shoulder the same fiduciary duty.”).
104. See, e.g., Iris H-Y Chiu, Fintech and Disruptive Business Models in Financial Products, Inter-
mediation and Markets – Policy Implications for Financial Regulators, 21 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 55, 90 
(2016) (“[I]t is for the providers of such automated portals to demonstrate that they meet the same stand-
ards of suitability as those imposed on investment advisers generally.”); KLASS & PERELMAN, supra note 
98, at 17 (lawyers for robo-advisers arguing that robo-adviser platform “fits entirely within the existing 
regulatory framework governing investment advisers”).
105. There may also be a role for the private bar to take in ensuring that robo-advisers operating 
under the 1940 Act live up to their fiduciary standards. See, e.g., Diana Novak Jones, Morningstar, Pru-
dential Face Class Action Over Robo-Adviser, LAW360 (Aug. 4, 2017) https://www.law360.com/arti-
cles/951428/morningstar-prudential-face-class-action-over-robo-adviser [https://perma.cc/3A9C-
PMNH] (describing putative class action alleging that investment advisers conspired to develop a robo-
adviser that directed clients to high fee investments for benefit of advisers).
106. SEC, IM GUIDANCE UPDATE, supra note 101, at 2.
107. Exec. Order No. 13771, Reducing Regulation and Controlling Regulatory Costs, 82 Fed. Reg. 
9339 (Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/01/30/presidential-executive-
order-reducing-regulation-and-controlling [https://perma.cc/FX3V-HTZC] (“Unless prohibited by law, 
whenever an executive department or agency (agency) publicly proposes for notice and comment or oth-
erwise promulgates a new regulation, it shall identify at least two existing regulations to be repealed.”).
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information about the industry emerges is a commonly used approach and 
recommended by some scholars as a means of evaluating technological in-
novation in the financial industry.108
Thus, before proposing regulatory changes to address the proliferation 
of robo-advisers, regulators should reflect upon the evolution of the 1940 
Act and similarities between that time and today. Like the then-new invest-
ment adviser category of professionals that Congress hoped to learn about 
through the 1940 Act, robo-advisers are not an entirely well-known, uniform, 
or understood entity.109 As regulators did in developing the contours of the 
1940 Act, existing rules and regulatory tools should be used to develop 
knowledge about how robo-advisers operate before constructing new regu-
lation.110 For example, the SEC can employ enforcement actions as it did in 
the early decades of the 1940 Act to learn about the robo-adviser industry, 
test whether the existing contours of the 1940 Act’s fiduciary standard apply 
to robo-advisers, and consider refining or expanding those contours as has 
been done in the past when the industry changed.111
In particular, because disclosure is a “bedrock principle of federal se-
curities law,”112 it should remain a key focus of regulators as they determine 
108. See, e.g., Chiu, supra note 104, at 63 (“[T]he regulatory engagement with financial innovation 
has always been one of relative passivity and catch-up. Regulators, cautious of not impeding the devel-
opment of competitive innovation and choice for consumers, often dismantle regulatory barriers to sup-
port competition or refrain from adding such barriers. This is because much of financial innovation 
depends on low cost and flexible models, which would be stifled by the high cost of regulation. Thus, 
regulators often take a ‘wait and see’ approach, preferring to monitor developments regulating financial 
innovation.”); id. at 94 (“The judgment-based approach championed internationally and in the United 
Kingdom can form the basis for a regulatory approach that adopts early monitoring and reflective con-
sideration of the key aspects of fintech innovation in terms of ‘change,’ ‘substitutive potential,’ and ‘struc-
tural impact.’”).
This approach is not without its risks. See, e.g., Lin, Compliance, supra note 87, at 166 (2016) (“[F]inan-
cial innovation frequently finds roots in attempts to evade or arbitrage new regulation.”). Regulators could 
be perceived as not protecting the investing public, and any scandal or crisis involving robo-advisers 
before regulators have crafted specific regulations may then result in over-regulation. See, e.g., id. at 166–
168 (describing over-regulation after economic crises, followed with cycle of deregulation in future years, 
which increase compliance costs).
109. See Arthur B. Laby, Models of Securities Regulation in the United States, 25 FORDHAM INT’L
L. J. 20, 26 (1999) (describing objections to regulation of investment advisers before promulgation of 
1940 Act including “that the profession was not yet mature enough to be regulated”).
110. Internationally, regulators are already taking this approach. IOSCO reports that eight regula-
tors, including FINRA and the SEC, “reported that their existing rules appear to be sufficient at the present 
time to cover automated advice tools . . . .” IOSCO UPDATE, supra note 21, at 13. 
111. See, e.g., Karmel, supra note 13, at 407 (“As frequently occurs when the SEC is unable to 
engage in rulemaking, it has attempted to impose its views concerning proper conduct upon investment 
managers through enforcement actions.”). Use of enforcement as an after-the-fact tool to regulate finan-
cial intermediaries is not without criticism, with some arguing for regulation before enforcement. See
Onnig H. Dombalagian, Preserving Human Agency in Automated Compliance, 11 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN.
& COM. L. 71, 81–83 (2016) (describing critiques of enforcement as regulatory tool and shift towards 
prophylactic regulatory scheme).
112. Black, supra note 13, at 306–07.
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what, if any, additional regulatory is necessary. Disclosure is a crucial aspect 
of fiduciary relationships because it goes to the heart of trust, the very rela-
tionship that some believe hardest for robo-advisers to achieve without a hu-
man touch.113 It is therefore not surprising that the robo-adviser industry and 
regulators alike recognize the important role disclosures play in transparency 
relating to robo-advisers’ operations, algorithms, limitations and assump-
tions.114 Regulators have already begun to focus on the quality and content 
of robo-adviser disclosures to ensure their compliance with the 1940 Act, 
concerned that customers will not fully understand what specifically the 
robo-adviser is providing to them.115 Scholars similarly argue that disclosure 
should be a key component of future regulation applicable to artificial intel-
ligence’s growth in the financial industry.116
Disclosure is not, however, a miracle cure that renders robo-advisers 
appropriate for every, or even any, investor.117 Indeed, commentators criti-
cize current robo-advisers operating under the 1940 Act for purportedly us-
ing their disclosures to limit the scope and character of their relationship with 
clients in an entirely permissible manner, but one that investors may not un-
derstand.118 From the time of the Capital Gains definition of fiduciary re-
sponsibilities owed by the investment adviser to the client, commentators 
113. SEC, FINTECH FORUM, supra note 4, at 18 (“[T]he most interesting part of this sort of disruption 
is that the paradigm of how we establish trust online is changing”). Others in the industry similarly believe 
that from an investor protection standpoint, FinTech boils down to trust. See, e.g., id. at 234 (“Are they 
[robo-advisers] trustworthy? And it’s not just does it work or is the disclosure right, but what is it about 
it that will make it trustworthy. . .?”).
114. Both the industry and regulators seem to agree the complete and clear disclosure of key ele-
ments of robo-advisers is required. See, e.g., BLACKROCK, supra note 9, at 10 (“[D]igital advisors should 
disclose to clients the limits of their services and their dependence on client-provided information.”); id. 
at 9 (“It is important that digital advisors reasonably design their algorithms based on their stated invest-
ment strategies and methods and make appropriate disclosures to clients concerning such investment 
strategies and methods.”); SEC, IM GUIDANCE UPDATE, supra note 101, at 3–6 (describing quality, quan-
tity, and form of disclosure that robo-advisers may need to meet requirements of 1940 Act); Investor 
Alert: Automated Investment Tools, SEC (May 8, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/oiea/investor-alerts-bulle-
tins/autolistingtoolshtm.html [https://perma.cc/SQ5D-S39D] (advising investors to “[r]eview all relevant 
disclosures for an automated investment tool”).
115. See, e.g., SEC, IM GUIDANCE UPDATE, supra note 101, at 3–6 (describing special considera-
tions for disclosure that may apply to robo-advisers due to their unique features); IOSCO UPDATE, supra
note 21, at 11 (describing regulators’, including FINRA and SEC, “concerns about customers lacking 
awareness of, or not understanding, the limitations of automated advice tools. Clients may not understand 
the service offered; for example that the automated advice tool may not consider their full financial and 
personal circumstances.”); MASS. SEC. DIV., supra note 103, at 1 (listing six items as minimum required 
disclosure).
116. Lin, Industry, supra note 69, at 599–603 (arguing for enhanced disclosure as component of 
multi-part framework for regulating “cy-fi”).
117. See generally Tamar Frankel, The Failure of Investor Protection by Disclosure, 81 U. CIN. L.
REV. 421 (2012).
118. Fein, Closer Look, supra note 98, at 3; Fein, Fiduciary Implications, supra note 98, at 6. But
see KLASS & PERELMAN, supra note 98, at 7 (arguing that investment advisers may limit the scope of 
their relationship with clients).
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suggested that disclosure may not be an effective device.119 Investor uses of 
and actions after disclosure are sometimes unintended or illogical.120 Disclo-
sures to consumer investors in the mutual fund context, a type of investment 
that appeals to the same retail investors as robo-advisers, have been criticized 
as too dense and difficult to read, let alone understand, even before SEC plain 
English requirements.121 Regulators should recommend robo-adviser disclo-
sures that do not suffer from this critique.122
In addition to using current tools, it is imperative that, along a parallel 
track, the current regulatory tools be studied to determine their efficacy in 
protecting consumers. For example, studying retail investor understanding 
of robo-adviser disclosures will provide valuable information from which to 
further evaluate this key tool.123 Thus, in addition to reviewing robo-adviser 
disclosures for completeness and accuracy, outside studies should be con-
ducted to evaluate consumers’ comprehension of disclosures being made to 
them.124 These studies should incorporate a focus beyond behavioral finance 
and cognitive biases and start with a threshold of comprehension. In partic-
ular, studies should incorporate experts in adult literacy to determine whether 
and how much information in disclosures is being comprehended and to de-
velop best practices for crafting effective disclosures that will allow inves-
tors to truly understand the contours of their relationship with their robo-
adviser.125
119. A case note describing the Capital Gains decision at the time of its issuance noted flaws inher-
ent in disclosure. The Supreme Court, 1963 Term, supra note 95, at 295 (“If the investing public is truly 
naïve, disclosure does not provide a realistic method of protection.”).
120. See, e.g., Laby, supra note 86, at 429–430 (describing concerns with disclosure of conflicts of 
interest as including lack of filtering of information between conflicted principal and client, understand-
ing the magnitude of bias the disclosed conflict creates, and focusing on investor and exclusion of how 
the disclosure impacts the discloser’s actions); Troy A Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Over-
load and its Consequences for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 441-443 (2003) (describing 
information overload and impact on decision making).
121. See, e.g., Black, supra note 13, at 325–27 (describing mutual fund disclosures as “dismal,” too 
complicated, and difficult to digest).
122. See Benjamin P. Edwards, The Professional Prospectus: A Call for Effective Professional Dis-
closure, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 40) (arguing that disclosures for a 
“Professional Prospectus” that would allow consumers to have more information about professional ser-
vice providers should presents “information in a short, standardized, and clear format”).
123. See Black, supra note 13, at 333 (“To state the obvious, the purpose of disclosure should be to 
provide useful information to investors.”); Paredes, supra note 120, at 418 (describing two necessary 
components of disclosure’s efficacy: that information is disclosed and that end users of the disclosure 
“use the disclosed information effectively”).
124. See, e.g., Paredes, supra note 120, at 420 (advocating “more empirical research to better under-
stand how investors process information and make investment decisions”); id. (“[T]he federal securities 
laws could be improved by accounting for how investors actually process information and make deci-
sions.”).
125. Black, supra note 13, at 337 (“[T]he likelihood that investors will be forced to participate in 
markets that they do not understand and that they do not perceive as fair should drive current reform 
efforts.”); Paredes, supra note 120, at 432 (“[F]or our mandatory disclosure system to work, securities 
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Moreover, it is necessary to explore the means of disclosure in addition 
to retail investors’ base comprehension of it. Robo-advisers’ technological 
innovations may be effective in deploying disclosures to retail investors.126
Accordingly, regulators should explore robo-advisers’ technological capac-
ities to deliver disclosures in a fashion more relevant to today’s investors.127
While technology could address some of the critiques of information over-
load associated with disclosures in investing, challenges nevertheless re-
main.128 Robo-advisers provide an interesting opportunity to determine if, 
and how, their purportedly consumer-friendly technology can be deployed 
to increase efficacy and consumer comprehension of disclosures.129 For ex-
ample, regulators and robo-advisers alike could explore robo-adviser capa-
bilities to track whether and to what extent their customer users read and 
understand disclosures and follow up with those consumers who may need 
additional attention to fully understand.130
market participants must not only have access to information, but must be able to search and process in 
an effective manner the information that is disclosed.”).
126. See, e.g., SEC, IM GUIDANCE UPDATE, supra note 101, at 5–6 (describing how consumer en-
gagement with robo-advisory platforms may require different format and character of disclosures involv-
ing technological innovation). In recent years, regulators have focused attention to the collection and 
dissemination of data in formats that will permit regulators and scholars to interpret and use the data with 
the hope that retail investors may also be able to benefit from the information. See Dombalagian, supra
note 111, at 74–75 (describing regulatory efforts to standardize and automate information relating to dis-
closures for more meaningful use); Paredes, supra note 120, at 479–480 (advocating for investor educa-
tion and training coupled with decision aids to encourage more effective investor use of disclosure).
127. Investor Advocate Rick Fleming has argued that current disclosure regimes have not kept up 
with how Americans access information and that “new technologies give us new opportunities to provide 
disclosure that is both comprehensive and comprehensible. Times have changed, and so should the deliv-
ery of information to investors.” Rick A. Fleming, Inv’r Advocate, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Effective 
Disclosure for the 21st Century Investor, (Feb. 20, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/022015-
spchraf.html [https://perma.cc/4XN4-7297].
128. See, e.g., Erik F. Gerding, Disclosure 2.0: Can Technology Solve Overload, Complexity and 
Other Information Failures?, 90 TUL. L. REV. 1143, 1167–1180 (2016) (discussing technology’s poten-
tial and challenges in addressing informational overload and complexity issues investors face in assessing 
securities and arguing for evidence to inform disclosure initiatives); id. at 1146 (“Can new technologies 
help investors understand complex firms, particularly financial institutions, as well as complex financial 
instruments and markets, while not overtaxing the cognitive abilities of individuals? Investors need a rich 
set of information to value firms and securities, but the fear is that they cannot process too much infor-
mation or that too much information will exacerbate behavioral biases and prompt cognitive errors.”).
129. See Lin, Industry, supra note 69, at 601 (arguing that “policymakers should examine new ways 
to leverage technology towards creating a better, more workable disclosure framework”)
130. For example, Canadian regulators require robo-advisers to follow up with a telephone call to 
any investor whose response to online initial information appears to be incorrect or inconsistent. See
IOSCO SOCIAL MEDIA REPORT, supra note 45, at 6. Robo-advisers could develop algorithms to deter-
mine whether customers need additional disclosure mechanisms if, for example, they have not spent a 
certain amount of time on a disclosure page before acknowledging that they have read it.
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CONCLUSION
Robo-advisory platforms, as newer entrants to an established advisory 
industry, challenge convention and will disrupt the provision of financial ad-
visory services in the future. Though “robo-adviser” is currently synony-
mous with innovation, the industry’s swift growth may render the services it 
provides so ubiquitous that the term will fade away.131 Yet the means through 
which advice is provided is not fully understood and will continue to 
evolve.132 Operating within an existing framework, the robo-advisers now 
regulated under the 1940 Act will challenge regulators to examine and artic-
ulate the parameters of the fiduciary duties they owe to the clients and how 
those duties will be met. However, just as with the promulgation of the 1940 
Act, the application of the current regulatory regime to a new breed of ad-
visers will guide regulators and shape investor protection policy after study 
and real-world experiences inform direction and identify needs and gaps. 
The new breed of investment advisers, robo-advisers, provide regulators 
with an opportunity to refocus on the core principles of the 1940 Act and use 
their current tool kit to guide future activity while evaluating whether the 
technology itself affords opportunities to better ensure that the consumer 
protection aspect of disclosure actually results in fully informed consumers.
131. In the SEC’s FinTech forum, robo-advisor Betterment’s CEO Ben Alden described how robo-
advisers may be subsumed into the lexicon of financial services as they continue to grow: “We don’t use 
“online brokerage” or “discount brokerage” quite the way that it was in the, you know, ‘80s–’90s, and I 
think, similarly, “robo-adviser” will drop away.” SEC, FINTECH FORUM, supra note 4, at 71.
132. See, e.g., Lin, Compliance, supra note 87, at 163 (arguing that technology will continue to 
transform all aspects of financial industry in future years).
